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PREVENTION AND HEALTH SERVICES ECONOMICS 1

Harold H. Gardner, M.D.
and
B. Delworth Gardner, Ph.D.
The relationship between doctors and
patients in the medical and health field is
a topic of recurrent discussion today.
The topic is of immense interest because
of the questions raised about value
received for services purchased and because of the large amount of economic
resource consumed.
The size of the stakes are such that the
debate will grow in the near future until
some solution is found to remedy the
value and cost for service dilemma.

If sense is to be made of the resource allocation problem in the medical industry,
it must be understood that the demand
for medical services is a derived demand.
What the consumer ultimately desires is
health or wellness. The demand for disease-treatment services only exists because there is some gap between the state
of existing health and that which is
desired or reasonably expected. Treatment is supposedly designed to close that
gap to acceptable levels, given the time
and financial resources available.
We discuss below some of the
troublesome issues, believing that the industry can be nudged significantly fur-

ther towards consumer control of the
treatment given rather than the current
domination of use decisions by the
producers.

The Information Problem

The level of desired health is a complex
bio-psych o-so cio-econom ic
phenomenon. It is axiomatic that no one
feels perfectly well all of the time. Further, the level of wellness is essentially
subjective; i.e., each person uniquely experiences illness, and the departure of
wellness from desired levels that might
induce one person to seek curative medical treatment might not do so for
another.
Obviously, knowledge about what optimal health is and how it can be achieved
by both preventive and curative
measures will determine in large
measure people's perceptions about
their quality of health.
In other words, there is a tradeoff between prevention and treatment as alternative means of achieving the desired
level of health. With known costs and

technologies, some diseases, such as
many forms of cancer and AIDS, are
more economically prevented than
treated, while others, such as the common cold and headaches, probably are
more economically treated than
prevented. In any event, theoretically,
personal health will be maximized from
a given expenditure of resources when
the marginal contributions to wellness
from investment in prevention and treatment are equal.
But for individuals desiring this optimal
level of health, the knowledge required
to estimate these margins is very costly to
obtain. Much of the information is highly technical and specialized and thus may
be largely inaccessible to those not
trained in medical science. Even for
those with such training, the relevant
knowledge on a wide spectrum of illnesses potentially applicable to any given
individual is scattered and constantly
changing. This is perhaps the principal
reason why consumers have rather passively deferred to those in the medical industry itself for information on disease
prevention and treatment. The problem
is that such information is likely to be
biased for reasons given below and thus
may not produce the desired maximization of health.

The Misallocation of Resources
Between Prevention and Treatment

There are at least two compelling
reasons for believing that the optimal
combination of prevention and curative-

treatment investment will not be reached
in our existing medical system:
1) The institutional system that deter-

mines who pays for services (primarily insurance and government programs)
discriminates in favor of curative versus
preventive alternatives, and
2) The supply side of the medical industry (physicians, nurses, hospitals, etc.)
face multi-dimensional incentives that
make it more profitable to engage in the
curative treatment of disease and illness
once it has occurred than preventing the
condition from occurring.
On the prevention side, costs are largely
privately borne by the individual. Very
few of these costs, except for limited
technical services, such as screening
physical examinations and diagnostic
tests, have been incorporated into group
health plans or insurance programs
where the costs are largely borne by
group sponsors or the collective of those
who pay the premiums.
Employers have not yet participated to a
significant extent in funding prevention
programs, particularly the educational
aspects where the professional service is
largely cognitive.
The information problem in preventing
disease is very large, but not because
there is little information about what
produces good health. Tremendous
quantities of resources have been
devoted to developing information, both
from private and public sources.

The problem is the usefulness of information; not enough information available when and where it is needed. The
quality of much health information is
poor and there is no systematic filtering
Jf health information for consumers. Inieed, the non-insured private health sec:or has produced a fantastic array of
tlleged health-inducing programs, mosty relating to diet and exercise regimes.
~ven though we fully accept consumer
overeignty in those decisions, partly be:ause few third-party dollars are inrolved, there is a general belief that the
nformation associated with all health
and medical services is so complex and
technical that many consumers find it too
costly to adequately evaluate. Thus,
much of what is claimed is believed to be
misleading, unreliable, and may even be
fraudulent.
Consumers are left bewildered, confused
and ill-equipped to make informed and
rational decisions. In addition, much of
the information that is reliable and useful is likely to be disputed by the medical
establishment because it produces
results that compete with the need for
curative treatment.

Insurance Programs
and the Incentive Problem

By contrast, payment for curative treatment of disease has largely become collectivized through a variety of insurance
programs, both private and governmental. The premiums are paid by both consumers (also taxpayers) who are enrolled

and their employers, depending on the
specific program. But generally the insurance premium for an individual is not
directly related to the quantity and
quality of medical resources consumed.

If the consumer of curative treatment
services is insured for most of the cost of
the service, the bulk of the service price
is passed on to the insurer. For the insured individual, the incentive is created
to consume medical services up to the
point where their value to him is far
lower than the true resource costs involved in supplying the service. Deductibles or programs which require the
insurer to pay a certain fraction of the
price shifts some of the payment burden
to the consumer, especially on the first
units of service until the deductible is exhausted. A payment limitation for hospital services paid by the patient further
masks the true resource costs to those
receiving such services.
It is well to remember, however, even if
the insurance coverage is one-hundred
percent, that not all costs connected with
acquiring the service are zero. There are
still arrangement-for-service costs,
transportation costs, waiting-time costs,
and psychic costs associated with treatment that must be borne by the recipient
of medical services. It is quite possible
for many insured patients that these costs
outweigh direct service-payment costs
for most illnesses, and it is these non-fee
costs that actually determine the quantity
of services demanded.
The upshot is that because the marginal
price of the service itself to the insured is
low or zero, a greater quantity of medical

services is demanded than would be the
case if the consumer had to pay the full
price and more resources will be devoted
to the industry than would be case if there
were no co-insurance programs.
There can be little doubt that the incentive problem discussed here is responsible in a major way for the huge
escalation of medical costs that we have
witnessed in the United States over the
past few decades. But we are not about
to forego insurance programs in order to
correct the distortions in resource allocation they produce. The risks to income
and wealth maintenance in the face of
serious illness are simply too great to
abandon their spreading through the
medium of insurance.
But perhaps the "ignorance" problem
could be at least mitigated significantly
by an information campaign to inform
consumers as to the true cost as well as
the real health benefit of medical services, even if they don't directly pay for
all of them.
Moreover, the resource allocation
problem is even more severe than implied by the insurance-pricing argument
just made. It is true that because of the
"collectivization" of the price of treatment services, it is probable that most
consumers are not even aware of what
price is being charged, or if they are, it
does not affect the treatment decision.
Obviously, the price is of minor importance in determining what treatment services are demanded. The service
prescribed becomes entirely supply-side
determined.

On the supply side of treatment, the price
is the full marginal revenue received by
the supplier for each unit of service.
Thus, it is the price that constitutes much
of the incentive for supplying the service.
The explosion of costly (and often highly
profitable) technologies currently
employed in the industry can be better
understood given the incentive problems
described above. There are simply few
effective brakes on these supply-side innovations. Moreover, the evolution of
the current state of affairs has probably
been encouraged and even accelerated
by the emergence of corporate sponsorship of insurance programs within the
health, medical and hospital industry.
But it is not the bloated and costly medical treatment industry that is the only
problem. Virtually every use of the existing medical treatment system carries risk
to personal health as well as potential
benefit. The hope is that the benefits
outweigh the costs making the risk worth
taking.
There is, however, substantial probability that use of the medical treatment
system itself will produce net outcomes
that will impair rather than produce
health. That is to say, the existing structure of services and incentives induces
decisions by the supply side of the industry to recommend tests, analyses,
monitoring, and treatments that may be
deleterious to good health. Complete
and thorough information about alternative treatments made available to the
demanders would almost certainly
reduce the risk of these types of treatment "errors."

Issues of Access

Practitioners working in the treatment
end of the medical services industry
might deny that there is an information
problem. After all, it is frequently argued that relying on the expertise of
those who know best ( the suppliers of the
service) must be optimal because the industry is essentially altruistic rather than
commercially motivated. It is argued
that it must be that way for it to sustain
its terribly important lifesaving function.
We do not deny that there is much
altruism in this industry (as there is in
many others.) But the point is largely irrelevant. The real question is whether or
not better consumer information about
health and alternative treatments for illness and what they cost will result in
greater health and a leaner, more efficient, and more competitive medical industry.
Changing "who decides" opens the door
to more efficient purchasing power by
those who ultimately provide it, the consumers of medical services.
However, choice is inherently subverted
by gatekeeper functions, particularly
those that are purely administrative, like
case-management programs. Similarly,
the movement toward limiting individual
choice by linking the insurance
mechanism to a service supplier system,
i.e., HMOs and PPOs, actively discourages consumer involvement in
decision making as there are no obvious
service options to choose from.

The implicit message to the individual is
that someone else knows best and that
access to any system represents
equivalent quality.
Further, an element that has weakened
competition within the medical and
hospital system, and thus has proved to
be deleterious to consumer interests, is
the notion that medical services in
general, and delivery systems tied to insurance mechanisms in particular, are
comprehensive. Consequently, often
preventive services are simply assumed
to be represented and attached to the
treatment services and that the only
needed consumer decision is to appear
and to be compliant.
There is increasing documentation of
serious problems with quality of service
as well as queuing in such arrangements
and the incentives are stacked against
prevention, particularly the educational
cognitive elements. As illustrated, the
attention given to prevention is notably
rhetorical rather than substantive.

New Directions
As a response to the conditions in the
medical treatment industry described
above, and especially the need for consumer information, Options and Choices
was established as a private health services organization specializing in prvention, in contrast to traditional diagnosisand treatment-oriented medical care organizations.

)ur approach to health is singularly
:hrough prevention and is operationalized as an education service, not a clinical diagnostic or prescriptive service.
The educative prevention service
promotes informed choice for individuals about their health and enhances market dynamics in the health
services industry. The primary goal of
the organization is to achieve a
redistribution of economic resources
currently consumed by curative-treatment services towards illness prevention
and health maintenance.
We are convinced that the health services industry can successfully operate
under market dynamics without unusual
risk to personal health. But consumers
must play a much more active role in
their health decisions, both at the
prevention as well as the treatment stage.
But they are not prepared to do so alone.
Professional support as well as information are critical to the valuation and
decision process. Both are reflective of
an educational process that permits a
person to learn how to make personal
health decisions reflecting informed
choice.
The Options & Choices philosophy relates health directly to the efficiency of
personal health (consumer) decisionmaking. The pivotal question, therefore,
revolves around the issues of who
decides and by what criteria are the
decisions made. One thing is apparent:
at the root of all decisions is the information required to make them efficient in
terms of what the consumer wants to
1chieve. What information is relevant,

where is it obtainable, what is it worth,
and what does it cost? These are the
critical questions for which Options &
Choices provides answers.
The professional staff function provided
by Options & Choices is designed to assist the individual in this valuation
process by facilitating access to needed
information and by supplying support to
the individuals while they are exercising
informed choice. When the decision
point shifts from supply-side professionals to the consumer, benefits to personal health and well-being, rather than
the service price, serves as the motivation
for the decision. The gains to the consumer from better decisions include a
higher level of health, a saving of real
resource non-price costs that would have
been spent in ill-advised treatment, and
greater productivity on the job. The
gains to employers would include a
reduction in health-benefit costs and less
absenteeism at work, and thus higher
levels of employee productivity.
We emphasize that this emphasis on
prevention is organized so as to compete
openly with treatment services. Its success will depend ultimately on whether or
not better health is achieved and by how
much medical costs are reduced.
The program is new but we now have the
expenditure results of a two-year
demonstration program at a major corporation whose employees work in New
York City. In addition, there is much
anecdotal evidence that the level of
health has improved and that absenteeism has fallen.

fhe table below shows employee numbers and costs for the baseline year
before the program was initiated and for
the first two years of program operation.
Costs in year 1 and 2 were corrected for
inflation so that the cost numbers reflect
constant real dollars.
The employees are divided into three
groups: column 1 ( total group) includes
all individual employees eligible to use
the Program at any time during the three
years, converted to full-timeequivalents. Column 2 (stable group)
represents those employees continuously Program eligible for the three years.
Column 3 includes those in the stable
group who incurred more than $10,000 of
medical claims costs per person in any of
the three years.
The very impressive results from this
demonstration program confirm the
findings from two years of pilot testing of

the program where a similar 47.4 reduction was achieved in the costs for highcost individuals, many elderly and of a
lower socio-economic status. Per capita
medical costs declined in the first year of
the program and even more in the second
year for all groups. The percentage point
decline was even more for the second
year than for the first year. Especially
significant are the results for the highcost group that consume a very large percentage of total treatment costs. The
second year shows a 53.1 percent pe:
case reduction over baseline.

It is apparent that the prevention
program had a very significant impact on
health decisions of this group and indicates that the program has great potential in reducing medical treatment costs
by creating market incentives while
protecting individual choice and health.

· FOOTNOTE
· 1Harold

H. Gardner, M.D., is president, chief executive officer and a director of Options & Choices
in Cheyenne, Wyoming.

B. Delworth Gardner, Ph.D., is a director of Op. tions & Choices and · a professor of economics at
Brigham Young University in Provo, Utah.

TABLE 1
GROUP COST EVALUATION DATA

TOTAL+
GROUP

STABLE+
GROUP

STABLE HIGH COST
(>$10,000)

702

365

9

$1,537

$29,532

365

9

BASELINE YEAR
Number
Costs•

$1,556

PROGRAM YEAR 1

Number
Costs

%Change

658

$1,471

$1,407

$23,780

-5.5

- 8.5

- 19.5

614

365

$1,290

$1,231

$13,852

-17.1

-19.9

-53.1

PROGRAM YEAR 2

Number
Costs

%Change

10

• Costs are based on a per employee contract basis with adjustment for inflation and
compared to baseline.

+

Total Group includes all individual employees eligible to use the Program at any
time during the three years and expressed in FfEs. Stable Group represents those
employees continuously Program eligible for the three years.

